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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to identify the deter-
minants of the rating assigned to sub-sovereign 
entities in Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, 
Italy and Spain, using a total of 92 territorial en-
tities for the 1989-2012 period. Multinomial or-
dered probit estimation models were estimated 
for each specifi cation and agency. 
We conclude that the country’s rating is one 
of the most important determinants of regional 
government’s ratings with a positive infl uence 
(as expected), and that the country debt/GDP 
ratio is a stronger determinant for regions than 
their own indebtedness with a negative sign. 
Other relevant variables are population growth 
rate, unemployment rate, elderly people weight, 
regional public expenditure weight and size. Ad-
ditionally, economic variables, such as country’s 
rating and population growth are more important 
to Fitch; whereas budget variables and size vari-
ables are more relevant to Moody’s. Debt vari-
ables and elderly people ratio are more import-
ant to S&P. 
Keywords: rating, sub-sovereign entities, 
multinomial ordered probit, international fi nancial 
markets.
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1. Introduction
The role played by ratings in the capital market is fundamental given that, in theo-
ry, in the savings-investment fl ow they minimize information costs when making de-
cisions. Moreover, they solve agency problems as it incentivizes the provision of safe 
and reliable information to decrease uncertainty and thus reduce the risk premium 
demanded by investors. With decreasing information costs, in theory, rating agen-
cies improve the effi  ciency of capital markets (Wakeman, 1984). Furthermore, Lane 
(1993) shows that the presence of rating agencies enhances issuers’ markets discipline 
because of the precise and transparent information they provide, and according to 
Liu and Thakor (1984) and Kliger and Sarig (2000), they give additional information 
that would have not been provided in another manner. Of the more than 130 existing 
agencies, the three most well-known (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch) 
have a market share of 94%, according to Lannoo (2010).
At least 77% of the sub-sovereign governments in the six countries of the study 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) have had one rating among the 
three most well-known credit rating agencies. Firstly, this requirement is explained 
because many have been borrowing from capital markets; and secondly, in the access 
to derivative and loan contracts, rating is needed. In these contracts, some banks have 
included rating trigger clauses, being able to require the early termination or redemp-
tion of the contracts if the rating was below a certain minimum rating.
Due to these circumstances, downgrades from credit rating agencies may have a 
huge impact for sub-sovereign governments increasing interest payments, reducing 
or restricting the access to capital markets or large sums of money due to loan early 
redemptions. Therefore, actually it is important for these sub-sovereign governments 
to know the more sensitive and relevant variables, credit rating agency comparison, 
and the existence of country bias in the rating decision. Unlike other articles that in-
clude sub-sovereign governments, the present article, using a total of 92 territorial 
entities for the period 1989-2012, focuses only on European countries with the aim of 
identifying the determinants of the rating assigned to sub-sovereign entities in Ger-
many, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain. 
Furthermore, we analyze the extent to which the models approach the real data. 
Within this context, the focus of this article is centered on the analysis of sub-sover-
eign governments’ ratings for a group of European countries characterized by diff er-
ent institutional frameworks and stark diff erences in terms of fi scal decentralization. 
The fact that this decentralization process towards regions has been underway for 
some time guarantees an analysis of whether or not agency ratings have been correct. 
Simultaneously, in a situation of economic crisis, the role played by rating agencies 
has changed with respect to previous, more stable periods. The analysis of sub-sov-
ereign governments’ ratings allows us to identify how credit ratings have varied and 
whether the infl uence of a modifi cation in a country’s rating is decisive with respect 
to its corresponding sub-sovereign entities. Therefore, the identifi cation of the ex-
planatory variables of the rating and, closely related, the correspondence between 
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the estimated ratings and the ratings actually assigned by agencies constitute a key 
element for understanding the role of agencies in the capital markets of European 
sub-sovereign governments.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing fi nancial litera-
ture about the determinants of ratings. In Section 3, we describe the ratings given to 
sub-sovereign entities in Europe. In Section 4, we describe the specifi cations of the 
rating based on a set of explanatory variables. In Section 5, the results of the rating 
estimates are explained. In Section 6, we compare the deviations between the actual 
ratings and the estimated ratings by country and agency. In Section 7, we explain 
marginal eff ects of the fourth specifi cations for each agency. In Section 8 we summa-
rize the main conclusions.
2. Literature review
The literature about ratings has att empted to link the eff ect of ratings with the 
spread (Reisen and Maltz an, 1999), to verify the independence of the rating agencies’ 
decisions (Gande and Parsley, 2004), to fi nd spill-over eff ects (Rigobon, 2002), to an-
alyze the existence of the pro-cyclicality (Gaillard, 2014), or to obtain the rating’s de-
terminants (Cheung, 1996; Afonso, 2003; Venneri, 2009). In the context of developing 
countries, Monfort and Mulder (2000), using a sample of 20 emerging countries in the 
period 1994-1999, show that credit ratings have a degree of inertia and follow a ran-
dom walk in an error correction model, and the lagged variables of debt related to ex-
port and growth of exports contribute to current ratings. Mulder and Perrelli (2001), 
using panel data for 25 countries, including emerging markets, fi nd that in the period 
1991-1999, the investment level related to the GDP is the only signifi cant factor. 
Afonso (2003) concludes that signifi cant variables include GDP per capita for de-
veloped countries, and that external debt plays an important role in developing coun-
tries. Subsequently, Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2009) use an ordered multinomial 
probit model with panel data from 66 countries in the period 1996-2005 to conclude 
that the signifi cant variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, debt, fi scal result, ex-
ternal debt, unemployment rate, infl ation, current account balance, reserves, govern-
ment effi  cacy and a default experience. Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006) use an ordered 
multinomial logit model with data from 86 countries from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch 
to conclude that the variations in ratings are due to GDP per capita, GDP growth, in-
fl ation, the exchange rate, history of defaults, the corruption index, and the quality of 
government management. 
More recently, Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2011) studied the determinants of 
global sovereign debt ratings, and their results indicate a good performance of the 
estimated models across agencies and time. Furthermore, Afonso and Gomes (2011) 
have concluded that fi scal imbalances are refl ected in the sovereign debt notations.
In the European context, Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012) use daily data on EU 
sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads to conduct an event study analysis on the re-
action of government yield spreads before and after announcements from rating agen-
113
cies. Their results show signifi cant responses of government bond yield spreads to 
changes in rating notations and outlook, particularly in the case of negative announce-
ments. Gaillard (2014) provides an analysis of sovereign ratings, including the recent 
default of Greece and concludes that credit ratings are more stable than market-based 
indicators, which means that their pro-cyclical role could have been much sharper. 
In the same year, Afonso, Gomes and Taamouti (2014) examined EU countries from 
1995 until 2011; they used sovereign ratings established by the rating agencies S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch concluding that rating upgrades do not have any signifi cant eff ect 
on volatility, but sovereign downgrades increase bonds volatility after two lags. 
In the area of sub-sovereign governments, there are a few published studies re-
garding the determination of ratings. Outside the US, Cheung (1996) uses an ordered 
multinomial probit model for nine Canadian provinces between 1969 and 1995 to 
conclude that the debt/GDP ratio, employment rate, provincial GDP, federal trans-
fers, and provincial revenues can signifi cantly explain the variations in ratings. Sa-
bourin (1999) employs a logit model for the Canadian provinces and is able to pre-
dict 63% of the ratings by S&P for the period 1976-1995. Subsequently, García-Romo, 
Ibarra-Salazar and Sotres-Cervantes (2005) implement ordered multinomial logit and 
probit models with the Fitch rating as the dependent variable for Mexican states for 
the period 2000-2003; they conclude that debt/GDP, current expenditures, and prima-
ry expenditures negatively aff ect the rating and that budgetary savings, investment 
expenditures, and variables representing the social and welfare situation positively 
aff ect the rating. 
Venneri (2009 and 2010) conducts a study of risk valuation for local Italian entities 
in the period 2004-2008 using an ordered multinomial probit model with data from 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. This paper intends to continue this line of research by per-
forming a study of sub-sovereign entities at European level.
3. The ratings of sub-sovereign governments in Europe
European sub-sovereign governments in the considered countries represent a to-
tal of 92 territorial entities. As a whole, 77% currently have or have had at least one 
rating assigned by one of the three largest credit rating agencies, and 35% have been 
assessed by more than one, a percentage considered high as far as sub-sovereign gov-
ernments are concerned. Nevertheless, this global number hides certain asymmetries 
when delving into matt ers at the country level. 
The use of ratings is common in regional European governments (Table 1), with 
the exception of France, where only 42.3% have had an assessment performed at least 
once, with 35% of regions currently having at least one rating. 
More asymmetries are observed upon comparing the regions with more than one 
rating. Italy and Spain are clearly the countries where regions have more ratings by 
agencies (13 and 9 regions respectively) when compared to sub-sovereign govern-
ments from other countries. There are some explanations that may justify the exten-
sive use of ratings. 
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Germany 16 10 12 6
Austria 9 7 8 2
Belgium 3 3 3 1
France 26 9 11 1
Spain 17 16 16 9
Italy 21 20 21 13
Total 92 65 71 32
Source: Own elaboration
Currently, the assessment of European sub-sovereign entities by rating agencies 
diff ers signifi cantly depending on the country. Fitch assesses sub-sovereign entities 
with greater proximity to the reference country and regardless of the particular coun-
try. This agency, for example, considers AAA all German Landers as their own sov-
ereign. Additionally, Fitch accounts for the fact that the Spanish Autonomous Com-
munities have a minimum rating of BBB-, i.e., they have an investment grade rating 
just two notches below their national level1. However, in this case, Moody’s and S&P 
diff er from Fitch as the dispersion of the ratings, when compared to the sovereign, is 
much greater, even after the implementation of various instruments at the centralized 
levels by the Spanish government to avoid default and to strengthen the institutional 
framework2 (Table 2). 
Table 2: Comparison of regional ratings and regional country ratings between agencies
Countries Germany Austria Belgium France Spain Italy
Max reg Moody’s Aaa Aaa Aa1 A1 Baa2 A3
Min reg Moody’s Aa1 A1 A1 A1 B1 Baa3
Country Rating Moody’s Aaa Aaa Aa3 Aa1 Baa3 Baa2
Max reg S&P AAA AA+ AA AA+ BBB+ BBB+
Min reg S&P AA- AA+ AA- AA- BB- BBB-
Country Rating S&P AAA AA+ AA AA+ BBB- BBB+
Max reg Fitch AAA - AA AAA BBB+ A
Min reg Fitch AAA - AA AA- BBB- BBB
Country Rating Fitch AAA AAA AA AAA BBB BBB+
Source: Own elaboration
Regarding the variability of ratings, we observe that with the fi nancial and sover-
eign crises, these downward rating variations have become more common and have 
1 Catalonia is an exemption to the investment grade fl oor by Fitch because of the independence 
process.
2 Specifi cally, these instruments refer to the Instituto de Crédito Ofi cial (ICO) ad-hoc lines in 2012, 
the fund for fi nancing repayment to suppliers, the Autonomous Liquidity Fund, and the new 
Organic Law of Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability (Law no. 2/2012). In this context, 
the rating of B1 by Moody’s or BB- by S&P for the Generalitat Valenciana is surprising.
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intensifi ed both in the number of downgrades and the notches, aff ecting almost ex-
clusively Italy and Spain. In some cases, the downgrades are caused by sovereign 
downgrades, which would demonstrate a certain positive correlation between both 
entities, and in other cases, the downgrades are due to the repayment capacity prob-
lems of the sub-sovereign entity itself.
In general, the ratings have been very stable over time in sub-sovereign govern-
ments in Europe as the average duration of ratings for the three agencies is 6 years; 
nevertheless, durations vary greatly among countries. In Spain and Italy, on average, 
the ratings are maintained for 2 or 3 years. This length of time is infl uenced by con-
tinued ratings downgrades in these countries’ regions during the last economic crisis 
and due to the eff ects of the ratings downgrades of the corresponding sovereign.
4. Rating assignment model specifi cations
The probit model explains the probability that a credit rating is assigned to a 
sub-sovereign government as a function of explanatory variables. It is constructed on 
the basis of the existence of a non-observable continuous variable (Y), which is a lin-
ear function of explanatory variables (X) with a vector β and an error ε. It is calculated 
according to the following expression:
jt, where the variable Yjt is the non-observable dependent variable of a sub-sover-
eign entity j at moment t, which depends on the values of the explanatory variables 
xjt, thus establishing the observed ratings of the sub-sovereign entity corresponding 
to values from 1 to 21.
The use of a discrete dependent variable in this specifi cation leads to the use of 
models with an ordered multinomial logistic function (logit) or with a normal distri-
bution (probit)3. Taking into account the fact that ratings are assessments ordered by 
the repayment capacity of fi nancial obligations on the respective expiry dates, and 
that they are expressed by a combination of lett ers, numbers, and signs, this naming 
is transformed into a numerical order, with the best assessment (Aaa/AAA) being 21 
and the lowest, i.e., D or C, being 1.
The independent variables that are included are those that are potentially consid-
ered for the ratings assessments by agencies. These variables are grouped into: 
 – Demographic variables: given that they could aff ect the rating on the expendi-
ture side or for the existence of economies of scale;
 – Economic variables: these refl ect the core variables which allow the sustainability 
of the public fi nances and the level of solvency;
 – Debt and Defi cit variables: these are related with the capability to repay the debt. 
The greater the debt and the defi cit, the lower capability to redeem the debt, and 
therefore weaker level of solvency;
 – Rating variables: the variable representing the rating assigned by the same agen-
cy to the country in question which refl ect the country’s infl uence on the regions.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 – Budgetary variables: we have considered variables which generate additional 
pressure on the expenditure side and then a weaker solvency as the ratio of to-
tal capital expenditure not fi nanced by capital income divided by the operative 
revenues of the region or the ratio of the total expenditure of a region to regional 
GDP. We have also considered the variables which refl ect a greater or smaller 
margin of maneuver and therefore a stronger or weaker credit risk as the ratio 
of operative expenditures, excluding fi nancial costs and the total expenditures of 
each region;
 – Politics dummies: according to the economic literature, there is a potential infl u-
ence on the budget performance depending on the government stability and the 
color of the government; and
 – Country dummies: these variables try to identify both the diff erent strength of 
the national institutional frameworks and the biases generated by rating agencies 
which cannot be explained through the other variables considered.
Furthermore, there is no potential endogeneity between regional rating and coun-
try variables (including country’s rating). The state variables infl uence the assign-
ment of the regional rating but not vice versa. The main reasons are two: fi rst, in 
every country the sovereign rating is a limit, in general, for the regional rating; and, 
second, the credit rating agencies take into account the country’s rating for the re-
gional rating decisions.
5. Results of the ratings estimates
We estimate the best 4 models for each agency. In model 1, we include the dum-
my variables COUNTRY and the country’s rating (RATINGCOUNTRYN); in model 
2, the country’s rating is included (RATINGCOUNTRYN) without the COUNTRY 
dummy variables; in model 3, the COUNTRY variables are present. Furthermore, we 
estimate a fourth specifi cation, using the same variables for each agency in order to 
be more comparable among them. The results are in Table 4.
First of all, we found the variable of country rating (RATINGCOUNTRYN) signif-
icant for each agency in the 3 estimates and positive, as expected. Thus, a bett er coun-
try rating has a positive eff ect on the regional rating. Moreover, country variables 
(GER, FRA, AUS, ITA, BEL) are signifi cant for each agency as there is a positive or 
negative eff ect in the rating as a function of the country to which the region belongs, 
regardless of the credit rating of the country. It shows the positive bias in the assess-
ments by rating agencies for German and Austrian Landers and French Regions un-
explained by other variables.
Regarding the demographic variables, the coeffi  cient of annual growth rate of the 
population (POPGROWTH) is signifi cant and negative in the majority of estimates, as 
expected, because demographic pressure can weaken the solvency of a region due to 
rigidities or the lack of revenue adjustments. In the case of S&P and Fitch, the density 
compared to country density (DENSCOMP) is signifi cant in some specifi cations and 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that higher density leads to lower expenditure pressure and is therefore a positive in-
fl uence on the rating. The population over 64 years (POP64A) is signifi cant and has a 
positive sign, which is contrary to what was expected, given that an aged population 
generates more healthcare and social services expenditures, therefore increasing to-
tal expenditure and net borrowing. This phenomenon may be explained because the 
most aged European countries, such as Germany, have bett er ratings.
Furthermore, for Moody’s and S&P, the region’s size, defi ned in terms of popula-
tion (SIZEPOP), is signifi cant and positive, meaning that the size of a region implies 
more diversifi cation and economies of scale in expenditure, which is a positive factor 
for obtaining a bett er rating. Meanwhile, this variable for Fitch has a negative sign.
Economic variables are also signifi cant in the models. Income per capita in terms 
of PPP (PPPREGION) is very signifi cant and positive, as was expected (higher lev-
els of a region’s population income imply bett er ratings from agencies). The unem-
ployment rate (UNEMP) is also signifi cant and negative, as expected; this means that 
higher levels of unemployment imply worse credit ratings. However, GDP growth 
(GDPGROWTH) is signifi cant in some estimates but has a negative sign, contrary to 
what was expected, which may refl ect the fact that countries with lower GDP growth 
have a lower potential growth rate due to lower labor participation rates. However, 
in other estimates, the sign is positive, as expected.
In the case of the ratio of debt stock to current revenues (DEBTIC), the relationship 
is signifi cant with a negative sign; in the case of the ratio of debt variation to current 
revenues (VARDETIC) is signifi cant in only 1 estimation, at 90% with a negative sign 
by Moody’s and signifi cant with a positive sign in the 3 S&P specifi cations. This re-
sult indicates that higher levels of debt lead to lower solvency and negatively aff ect 
the rating awarded by the 3 rating agencies considered. 
Regarding the potential external infl uence of the country’s debt level on the rat-
ings of its regions (DEBTSTATEGDP), we confi rm this infl uence to be signifi cant and 
with a negative sign, as was forecasted. In other words, a higher level of country’s 
debt/GDP generates a negative eff ect on the ratings of the country’s regions, regard-
less of their indebtedness and defi cit.
Another analysis focused on whether each of the rating agencies performs assess-
ments taking into account the cyclical position, as they state repeatedly (through the 
cycle). Of the three estimates from Moody’s, in only one estimation there is evidence 
of signifi cance that the economic cycle can impact the determination of the rating. 
The dummy GAPBIN has a positive sign. For S&P and Fitch, a variable such as GAP-
COUNTRY (the diff erence between the GDP growth of the country and potential 
growth) is signifi cant and positive. 
Of the theoretical budgetary variables, 5 are signifi cant for Moody’s, 4 are signif-
icant for S&P, and 2 are signifi cant for Fitch. The ratio of primary balance to current 
revenues (SAVEBEFINT) is signifi cant in 10 specifi cations with a positive sign (with 
the exception of one S&P specifi cation), as was expected given that a bett er current 
result leads to a bett er rating. The ratio of the volume of capital expenditures not 
120
fi nanced with capital revenues to current revenues (CAPITALINC) is signifi cant in 
4 estimates, and has a negative sign, as was forecasted, because more pressure to 
conduct investment weakens solvency and, consequently, the rating. Regarding the 
weight of current non-fi nancial expenditures on total expenditures (NFCETE), the 
variable is signifi cant in a specifi cation, and has a negative sign, as was assumed, as 
the greater weight of current expenditures implies a smaller margin for maneuvering 
and therefore more weakness and a lower rating. However, the budgetary variable 
relating primary balance4 with fi nancial expenditures (the so-called interest cover-
age – SAVEINT) is signifi cant and positive in almost all specifi cations. The expected 
sign is positive because more interest coverage is positive for solvency, and therefore 
should always positively infl uence the rating. 
Regarding the weight of public expenditure in the region (EXPENDGDP), this 
variable is relevant and has a positive sign in the 12 estimates. The explanation to 
this fact is that if the scope of the study corresponded to one country only, with a 
sole institutional framework, then the sign should be negative; however, given that 
we are studying diff erent economies that have heterogeneous expenditure structures, 
obtaining a positive sign is not unusual given that the greater the expenditure over 
GDP is the bett er the rating can be, provided that the earning structure covers the ex-
erted competencies. In short, the region would be bett er considered.
Finally, for political variables, having an absolute majority (MAJOR) is a signifi -
cant variable in the specifi cations, with a positive sign for Moody’s and a negative 
sign for S&P. Absolute majority implies greater government stability and therefore 
should positively infl uence the rating. 
6. Comparison of estimated ratings to actual ratings
Once the estimations of the ratings have been performed, it is interesting to an-
alyze the extent to which the models have approached the real data. Hence, a com-
parison is made between the actual ratings, which have been given by the 3 main 
agencies, and the implicit rating obtained by the estimate. With that aim, our study 
focuses on calculating the degree of undervaluation or overvaluation reached, the 
proportion of issuances in which the external and the implicit ratings do not match, 
and among this latt er category, those that are justifi ed because their variation does 
not exceed 10% (Table 5). 
Overvaluation exists when the implicit rating is less than the rating given by rat-
ing agencies; undervaluation exits when it is otherwise. The results are grouped by 
countries, which are composed of diff erent sub-sovereign debt issuers. The analysis 
within each country is divided by agencies to facilitate comparison.
4 Primary operating balance is defi ned as net operating balance plus net interest expense.
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Table 5: Deviations between the actual rating and the implicit rating by country and agency
Country – agency % undervalued % overvalued % Difference % probability 
Germany – Fitch 0 0.50 0.50 -
 – Moody’s 22.80 14.79 37.48 19.00
 – S&P 16.80 17.10 33.90 16.80
Austria – Moody’s 33.33 52.99 61.54 5.60
 – S&P 21.60 5.10 26.70 37.00
Belgium – Fitch 36.10 19.40 55.60 20.00
 – Moody’s 38.50 26.90 65.40 21.60
 – S&P 26.90 15.40 42.30 21.21
Spain – Fitch 21.00 18.70 39.60 17.80
 – Moody’s 31.70 26.81 58.51 22.30
 – S&P 21.79 18.97 40.77 21.38
France – Fitch 21.80 25.00 46.80 12.87
 – Moody’s 41.03 26.15 67.18 29.00
 – S&P 34.10 30.40 64.50 17.61
Italy – Fitch 33.30 20.00 53.30 28.65
 – Moody’s 28.35 27.21 55.56 26.15
 – S&P 34.19 23.08 57.26 23.13
Source: Own elaboration
When we diff erentiate the results by country, we observe that the ratings giv-
en to the German regions are those in which the actual and the implicit ratings are 
closer, with only 0.5% mismatched in the case of Fitch and increasing to a diff erence 
of 37.48% and 33.9% for Moody’s and S&P, respectively. The result means that the 
ratings belonging to the German Landers’ issuances are more reliable because they 
adjust to their theoretical level. By contrast, we can fi nd the French sub-sovereign 
issuers because, in the case of Moody’s and S&P, more than 60% of the actual ratings 
of their issuances do not match the implicit credit rating, and in the case of Fitch, the 
percentage decreases to 46.8%. The other countries are closer to the French case than 
to the German one because, in more than 50% of the observations, they exhibit diff er-
ences between the actual rating and the implicit rating. In sum, this implies that the 
model does not refl ect the reality for most countries very well, fi nding more under-
valued issuances rather than overvalued, overall.
7. Marginal eff ects of the estimates
The marginal eff ects allow us to know the elasticities of the variation of the prob-
ability of a specifi c rating related with the variation of each independent variable, for 
each given rating. Furthermore, through the marginal eff ects it is possible to deter-
mine which variables are more infl uential on changes in ratings for each rating agency.
Analyzing the marginal eff ects of the fourth specifi cation for each rating agency 
(Tables 6, 7 and 8) we can see that the improvement in 1 notch of the country’s rating 
increases by 11.01% the probability of maintenance in Aa2 for the regions rated Aa2 
by Moody’s; or the increase by 10% of the PPPREGION, reduces by 6.1% the proba-
bility of maintenance in AA for the regions rated AA by S&P, and therefore increases 
the probability of an improvement of the rating; or the increase by 10% of the DEBTIC 
rises the probability by 3% to remain in the same rating (AA).
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Table 6: Marginal effects for Standard & Poor’s
 AAA/Aaa AA+/Aa1 AA/Aa2 AA-/Aa3 A+/A1 A/A2 A-/A3
RATINGCOUNTRYN 26.20% -2.07% -20.11% -3.96% -0.06% -0.001% 0.000%
BEL -23.97% -11.15% 23.78% 10.93% 0.39% 0.008% 0.001%
FRA 45.67% -18.24% -24.11% -3.28% -0.04% 0.000% 0.000%
ITA -37.34% -11.07% 33.12% 14.70% 0.57% 0.012% 0.001%
POPGROWTH -5.52% 0.44% 4.24% 0.83% 0.01% 0.000% 0.000%
POP64A 3.72% -0.29% -2.85% -0.56% -0.01% 0.000% 0.000%
SIZEPOP 1.38% -0.11% -1.06% -0.21% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000%
PPPREGION 0.80% -0.06% -0.61% -0.12% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000%
UNEMP -2.34% 0.19% 1.80% 0.35% 0.01% 0.000% 0.000%
DEBTIC -0.38% 0.03% 0.30% 0.06% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000%
SAVEBEFINT -0.44% 0.03% 0.34% 0.07% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000%
EXPENDGDP 1.55% -0.12% -1.19% -0.23% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000%
SAVEINT 0.78% -0.06% -0.60% -0.12% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000%
Source: Own elaboration
Table 7: Marginal effects for Moody’s
 AAA/Aaa AA+/Aa1 AA/Aa2 AA-/Aa3 A+/A1 A/A2 A-/A3
RATINGCOUNTRYN 1.66% 15.91% 11.01% -18.26% -8.26% -1.94% -0.116%
BEL -0.98% -15.61% -26.36% 2.89% 23.68% 13.93% 2.300%
FRA 2.91% 16.99% 4.96% -18.42% -5.35% -1.04% -0.052%
ITA -1.44% -14.64% -12.36% 15.89% 9.60% 2.74% 0.207%
POPGROWTH -0.76% -7.26% -5.02% 8.33% 3.77% 0.89% 0.053%
POP64A 0.16% 1.54% 1.07% -1.77% -0.80% -0.19% -0.011%
SIZEPOP 0.13% 1.21% 0.84% -1.39% -0.63% -0.15% -0.009%
PPPREGION 0.06% 0.54% 0.37% -0.61% -0.28% -0.07% -0.004%
UNEMP -0.26% -2.49% -1.73% 2.86% 1.29% 0.30% 0.018%
DEBTIC 0.00% -0.03% -0.02% 0.04% 0.02% 0.00% 0.000%
SAVEBEFINT 0.04% 0.40% 0.28% -0.46% -0.21% -0.05% -0.003%
EXPENDGDP 0.15% 1.42% 0.98% -1.63% -0.74% -0.17% -0.010%
SAVEINT -0.02% -0.18% -0.12% 0.20% 0.09% 0.02% 0.001%
Source: Own elaboration
Table 8: Marginal effects for Fitch
 AAA/Aaa AA+/Aa1 AA/Aa2 AA-/Aa3 A+/A1 A/A2 A-/A3
RATINGCOUNTRYN 23.68% 6.82% -22.71% -7.41% 0.17% -0.02% -0.001%
BEL 55.52% -8.14% -42.20% -5.00% 0.08% -0.01% 0.000%
FRA -4.07% -1.33% 3.89% 1.43% 0.22% 0.00% 0.000%
ITA -27.94% -13.87% 20.89% 18.82% 0.98% 0.17% 0.015%
POPGROWTH -30.03% -8.65% 28.80% 9.40% 0.21% 0.02% 0.001%
POP64A -1.12% -0.32% 1.07% 0.35% 0.02% 0.00% 0.000%
SIZEPOP -1.11% -0.32% 1.06% 0.35% 0.01% 0.00% 0.000%
PPPREGION 0.80% 0.23% -0.77% -0.25% 0.01% 0.00% 0.000%
UNEMP -4.22% -1.22% 4.04% 1.32% 0.03% 0.00% 0.000%
DEBTIC 0.17% 0.05% -0.16% -0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000%
SAVEBEFINT 0.41% 0.12% -0.39% -0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000%
EXPENDGDP 2.69% 0.78% -2.58% -0.84% 0.02% 0.00% 0.000%
SAVEINT -0.70% -0.20% 0.68% 0.22% 0.01% 0.00% 0.000%
Source: Own elaboration
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Calculating the standard deviation of the marginal eff ects for each variable and 
rating agency for all the outcomes of the specifi cations (Table 9), the most relevant 
variables are RATINGCOUNTRY (Country rating) and country variables. The oth-
er relevant variables are POPGROWTH, UNEMP, POP64A, EXPENDGDP and 
SIZEPOP. 
Table 9: Standard deviations of marginal effects
MOODYS S&P FITCH
RATINGCOUNTRYN 11.42% 13.61% 14.01%
BEL 16.87% 15.19% 28.74%
FRA 10.73% 22.40% 2.44%
ITA 10.96% 21.72% 17.15%
POPGROWTH 5.21% 2.87% 17.77%
POP64A 1.11% 1.93% 0.66%
SIZEPOP 0.87% 0.72% 0.66%
PPPREGION 0.38% 0.41% 0.48%
UNEMP 1.79% 1.21% 2.49%
DEBTIC 0.02% 0.20% 0.10%
SAVEBEFINT 0.29% 0.23% 0.24%
EXPENDGDP 1.02% 0.80% 1.59%
SAVEINT 0.13% 0.41% 0.42%
Source: Own elaboration
Finally, we analyze for each rating agency which variable or group of variables 
are more important for the rating. For Fitch the economic variables (UNEMP and 
PPPREGION), the country rating (RATINGCOUNTRY) and POPGROWTH are more 
important whereas the budget variables – SAVEBEFINT, EXPENDGDP and size vari-
able (SIZEPOP) are more important for Moody’s. The debt variable (DEBTIC and PO-
P64A) is more relevant for S&P than for the other agencies. 
8. Conclusions
The role played by ratings has been fundamental for European regions seeking 
fi nancing, especially on capital markets. The signifi cant power of rating agencies is 
underpinned not only because investors fi nd their opinions useful, but also because 
they are included in the regulations of various countries, in private contracts and in 
the investment policies of institutional and banking investors. The credit rating agen-
cy downgrades may have a huge negative impact for European sub-sovereign gov-
ernments due to their relative high level of indebtedness and their use of the fi nancial 
products.
To estimate the signifi cant variables that aff ect agency ratings, data from Moody’s 
and S&P from 2000-2012 and data from Fitch from 2001-2012 were used. Multinomial 
ordered probit estimation models were produced for each specifi cation and agency, 
and the signs of the signifi cant variables for the three agencies were considered. The 
dependent variable considered is the agency rating transformed into a numerical or-
der variable, in which the best assessment (AAA/Aaa) is 21 and the lowest D or C is 1.
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The fi rst conclusion is that European sub-sovereign governments have to take into 
account the most determinant variables for the ratings, namely country ratings (RAT-
INGCOUNTRY) and country variables, even if these are not under their direct con-
trol. It shows the strong infl uence that solvency and the national institutional frame-
work has in their rating. 
The second is that country variables have bias and therefore German and Austrian 
Landers and French Regions have bett er ratings, unexplained by other variables.
Third, budget, economic and debt variables are signifi cant for the rating’s deci-
sion, but more important variables are population growth rate, unemployment rate, 
elderly people weight, regional public expenditure weight and the size.
Fourth, the variables that explain the ratings of European sub-sovereign entities 
diff er from one another, and depending on the credit rating agency chosen by Euro-
pean sub-sovereign governments these should focus more on some specifi c variables 
to prevent any downgrade. According to the estimates, Moody’s is greatly infl uenced 
by political factors in determining ratings, giving higher ratings to regions that have 
governments with absolute majorities; however S&P penalizes this type of factor. This 
fi nding shows that the discrepancies in determining ratings transmit instability to 
market investors. Additionally, economic variables are more relevant to Fitch whereas 
budget variables or debt variables are more important to Moody’s or S&P respectively. 
The ratings of European regions have an average stability of 6 years, although in 
the case of Spain or Italy, the average stability is between 2 and 3 years due to the 
systematic downgrades of recent years, owing to the eff ects of the fi nancial crisis. 
Political variables, such as absolute majority or a right-wing government, are also sig-
nifi cant in the specifi cations, which leads to an improvement in ratings, while the fact 
that a region is ruled by the same party as the central government worsens the rating, 
perhaps due to more laxity in compliance with fi scal targets.
Fifth, regarding the diff erence between the specifi cations’ explicit and implicit rat-
ings, in general, they have a bias to be undervalued. That is, the implicit rating is 
superior to the explicit rating, and we can also fi nd diff erences between the three 
agencies. On average, the Austrian Landers are very overvalued by Moody’s and un-
dervalued by S&P; by contrast, on average, Moody’s undervalues the German Land-
ers and S&P overvalues them.
Finally, despite the advances made, the role of agencies in rating assignments to 
European regions presents diff erences among them that are very signifi cant. This cir-
cumstance has generated confusion in the market and has made diffi  cult the consoli-
dation of agencies, precisely at a time of strong market appeal. 
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